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CHAPTER 7 
Risk Information Seeking 
and Processing Model 
Sharon Dunwoody and Robert f. Griffin 
·Introduction 
You could be forgiven if a 2006 study published in 
Science about decision making led you to conclude 
that thoughtful. effortful information seeking and 
processing were irrelevant to risk judgments. In that 
study. Dijksterhuis. Bos. Nordgren. and van Baaren 
(2006) found that simple choices (e.g .• choosing 
among soap brands) were indeed improved if made 
immediately after conscious thought; complex deci-
sions were not. In their experiment. individuals 
made better choices of cars (the complex condition) 
not when asked to select a car to buy immediately 
after considering several models across a dozen 
attributes but after a distraction took their minds off 
cars altogether for a period oftime. 
Put another way. the researchers argued that 
decisions about complicated things improve if an 
individual "sleeps on it" and then makes a quick 
decision, without engaging in conscious pondering. 
They call this process the "deliberation-without-
attention" effect. 
That seemingly volitional behaviors can be cata-
lyzed by processes about which actors are unaware 
is a fascinating idea that may become fertile ground 
for the next generation of risk communication 
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scholars. But while important decisions may indeed 
stem from unconscious processing, our brains can 
pull this off only if they actually have something to 
process; and that somethiJ.1g is information. Thus, 
we argue in this chapter that information seeking 
and processing are critical components of risk deci-
sion making. Individuals vary greatly in the energy 
expended on these processes. and that variance 
may spell the difference between the formation of 
volatile versus stable attitudes about a risk. as well 
as the difference between acting or not acting in 
response to a risk. 
Below. we examine the concepts of informa-
tion seeking and processing, with a particular 
focus on their employment in risk decision mak-
ing. We then focus on the risk information seek-
ing and processing (RISP) model. devised to 
explore predictors of these information behav-
iors within a risk context. In the third part of the 
chapter, we present some original data analysis in 
service to testi_ng the consistency of the RISP 
model across different types of risks and over 
time. Finally, we return to the "deHberation-
without-consciousness" effect to offer a few last 
words regarding unobtrusive motivators of these 
information behaviors. 
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Information Seeking 
and Processing 
Of the two concepts, information processing has 
received far more attention in the social sciences, 
in part because it has been a focus of a number 
of popular psychological theories about social 
cognition. However. as new information chan ~ 
nels make user control increasingly (and, often, 
disconcertingly) common, the process of infor-
mation seeking is becoming more salient as a 
• !:'research focus. We take a look at information 
~~eking first and then move on to information 
f . processtng. 
.Information Seeking 
The concept of "information seeking" can be 
described as a volitional process of selecting 
information channels to reach desired informa· 
tional goals. as well as one of making choices to 
attend to messages embedded in any particular 
channel. Although scholars have always assumed 
that information seeking would be the inevitable 
outcome of a perceived gap in one's knowledge, 
. studies in information science, in communica-
tion, and, most recently, in the subfields of health 
and risk communication have made it clear that 
seeking behaviors are coinplex and contingently 
driven (Robson & Robinson, 2013). While most 
individuals, when faced with information gaps, 
express a desire for additional information, cir-
cumstances typically limit the number who 
progress to actual informati~n seeking behaviors. 
Information seeking models describe a num-
ber of factors that affect that progress to behavior, 
such as perceptions of an issue, including judg-
ments of the issue's seriousness; enabling factors 
that reflect a person's perceived ability to search 
for information, including an individual's beliefs 
about the efficacy of available channels; and rein-
forcing factors such as the perceived utility of the 
seeking behaviors themselves (see, e.g. , Green & 
Kreuter, 2005; Robson & Robinson, 2013). Many 
of these models were constructed to serve scholars 
in fields such as Library sciences and information 
studies. Within communication, several models 
have been utilized over the years. 
For example, Chaffee (I 986) posited two 
information seeking factors that share much with 
those articulated above. He argued that, in a 
search for information, individuals will be guided 
by two elements: (1) the cost of accessing any 
particular information channel and (2) the likeli -
hood that a channel will contain information 
relevant to the need. Here, the term channel is 
not an omnibus term but, rather, is intended to 
distinguish "channel" from "source." Channels 
gather, package, and then convey information 
acquired from sources. While much research has 
examined source credibility, we argue that audi-
ence tendencies to take cognitive shortcuts mean 
that they may rely on the credibility of channels 
more than on the credibility of sources. (For an 
extended discussion of the channel concept, see 
Dunwoody & Griffin, 2014.) 
"Cost;' in Chaffee's calculus, means much 
more than dollars and cents. Searching for a 
channel can also be costly in terms of time or in 
terms of the stress induced when folks find them-
selves searching in ambiguous circumstances. 
(Key word searches of the electronic universe 
offer a good example of the latter.) Chaffee's two 
dimensions handily explain individuals' prefer-
ence for physicians as channels for health infor-
mation (high relevance but high cost) and their 
overwhelming use, instead, of mediated chan-
nels, including the Internet (potentially low rele-
vance but low cost) (Hesse et aI., 2005). 
Another popular framework for information 
seeking scholarship, the "uses and gratifications" 
perspective, emphasizes the goodness of fit 
between an individual's specific information 
goals and the type of content provided by a chan -
nel. It assumes that individuals' channel choices 
are "goal-directed, purposive and moti."ated" 
(Rubin, 2009, p. 167) and that information seek-
ers base future channel choices on an assessment 
of the ability of anyone channel to meet their 
information needs. A uses-and-gratifications 
framework, thus, may predict to the employment 
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of different channels for different risk communi-
cation goals. A chemical spill may lead a person 
to emphasize "surveillance" initially and to keep 
the television tuned to a credible news channel; 
later, that individual may opt into interpersonal 
channels for explanatory help and advice about 
personal protection strategies. 
Another "seeking" alternative. of course, is to 
choose to avoid information about a risk (Case. 
Andrews, Johnson, & Allard, 2005; Howell & 
Shepperd, 2013; Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller, & 
Shepperd, 2010). Although rarely acknowledged 
in the general information seeking literature. 
avoidance has become increasingly salient in 
communication studies of risky situations. Witte's 
(1992) extended parallel process model offers 
one rationale for its selection: When highly fear-
ful risks are coupled with few or no means of 
reducing one's exposure to those risks, individu-
als may opt to "manage" their fear by avoiding 
-risk information altogether. 
Information Processing 
The scientific study of the ways people process 
information began decades ago (see, e.g., 
Norman, 1976). We find one of the most useful 
model "types" for communication to be the dual-
processing models in psychology. These theories 
have in common a differentiation between cogni-
tive processes that are fast and automatic versus 
those that are purposive and effortful. The for-
mer are labeled heuristic, reflexive. and intuitive. 
while the latter are often termed analytic, high 
effort, and rational (Evans, 2008, p. 257). The 
duality seems to have evolved. in part, to account 
for the apparent contradiction between people's 
capacity to invest time and effort in making 
meaning and their tendency to, instead. "satisfy 
their goal-related needs in the most efficient 
ways possible" (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 330). 
One of the more successful dual-process theo-
ries is Shelly Chaiken's heuristic- systematic 
model (HSM). Chen and Chaiken (1999) differ-
entiate between the two basic modes as follows: 
Systematic processing entails a relatively ana-
lytic and comprehensive treatment of judg-
ment-relevant information. Judgments 
formed on the basis of systematic process-
ing are thus responsive to the actual content 
of this information. Given its nature, sys-
tematic processing requires both cognitive 
ability and capacity. . . . The other basic 
mode, heuristic processing, entails the activa-
tion and application of judgmental rules or 
"heuristics" that, like other knowledge 
structures. are presumed to be learned and 
stored in memory .. .. Relative to systematic 
processing. heuristic processing makes 
minimal demands on the perceiver. (p. 74) 
Most of the dual-processing models (for a 
comprehensive list and discussion. see Evans, 
2008) assume that people can engage in sys-
tematic and heuristic processing simultane-
ously, but the theories typically describe 
systematic processing as more desirable than 
its heuristic counterpart. Heuristic processing 
is seen as a "cognitive s~ortcut" that may lead 
to flawed decisions. Wimmer and Shohamy 
(2012) offer phYSiological evidence of the role 
of the brain in facilitating such shortcuts by, for 
example, increasing the likelihood that past 
experience will "bias" decisions made in novel 
situations. 
Indeed, although some scholars promote the 
pragmatic benefits of heuristic decision making 
(see, e.g., Gigerenzer, 2007; Gigerenzer & Selten, 
2002), numerous studies have suggested that 
systematic processing is more likely to lead to 
stable attitudes and behaviors (Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Natter & Berry, 2005), 
attributes presumably of value in risky situa-
tions. The HSM assumes, in fact, that a person's 
recognition that she has too little information to 
make a confident judgment about a risk is 
enough to send her into systematic processing 
mode; the perception of insufficient informa-
tion. in other words, will motivate her to devote 
time and energy to deliberative work (Trumbo, 
McComas, & Besley, 2008) . 
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In the RISP model described in the next section, 
we adopt the position that effortful information 
gathering and processing are not only important 
precursors to making good risk judgments, but they 
are also important behaviors in and of themselves. 
The RISP Model 
RlSP evolved from a perceived need to make the 
seeking and processing of risk information cen-
!tral foci of study. Although numerous studies 
~ave utilized one or the other of these concepts 
", 
(see, e.g., Cline & Haynes, 2001; Czaja, Manfredi, & 
Price, 2003; Kreuter et al., 2007; Matthews, 
SeUergren, Manfredi, & Williams, 2002), few risk 
scholars have sought to explore factors that 
would predict differential use of these two 
processing strategies. Thus, the model employs 
risk information seeking and processing as 
dependent-not independent- variables to bet-
ter understand the factors that might prompt 
individuals to engage in more or less effortful, 
analytical work when faced with a risk. 
An early goal of the model was to avoid rein-
venting the wheel, so we focused on adapting 
concepts that existing scholarship had shown to 
be important to information seeking and pro-
cessing behaviors. We culled those concepts from 
several well-known approaches; among them 
were Slavic's "psychometric paradigm" (Slavic, 
1987), the HSM discussed above, and Ajzen's 
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1988). We 
now turn to a discussion of the primary compo-
nents of the model and the theories from which 
they were gleaned. 
Figure 7.1 provides a visual representation of the 
model. While the original model moved beyond 
information seeking and processing-with Ajzen's 
theory of planned behavior as foundational-to 
predict risk-related coping behaviors (Griffin, 
Dunwoody, & Neuwirth, 1999), it is the ftrst part of 
the model, represented in the figure, that has been 
most rigorously tested and given the RISP label. 
Risk Information Seeking and Processing Model 
individual 
characteristics 
Relevant 
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seeking and 
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RlSP posits that risk information seeking and 
processing will be driven primarily by a person's 
subjective assessment of the gap between what he 
knows about a risk and what he feels he needs to 
know in order to respond to that risk adequately. 
That information gap judgment, in turn, will stem 
from an array of factors, including characteristics 
of the individual such as socioeconomic status 
and ideological predisposition, perceptions of the 
hazards posed by the risk, level of worry about the 
risk, and perceived social normative pressures to 
learn about the risk. Finally, the model predicts 
that beliefs about the available information chan-
nels and perceptions of one's ability to gather 
information effectively will moderate the link 
between the perceived information gap and a 
person's information seeking and processing 
intentions. Although the model takes affect into 
account. RISP is essentially cognitive in nature. 
To make this chapter manageable, we will 
briefly explain a subset of the model's variables: 
- the information seeking and processing depen-
dent variables; two important motivators, the 
perceived information gap, labeled "information 
(in)sufficiency:' and informational subjective 
norms; and two mediating concepts. relevant 
channel beliefs and perceived information gath-
ering capacity. We direct the reader to other dis-
cussions of the model for a fuller explanation of 
these and additional components (Griffin, 
Dunwoody, & Yang, 2013; Griffm et aI., 1999). 
Informat ion Seeking and Processing 
Just as information processing can have both 
heuristic and systematic dimensions. so might 
information seeking reflect more or less effortful 
work. One novel aspect of RlSP is its effort to 
design heuristic and systematic measures of seek-
ing and then to allow those aspects to interact with 
heuristic and systematic aspects of processing. 
Thus. someone could seek information heuristi-
cally, which the model labels "routine," by encoun-
tering information about a risk through her normal 
surveillance habits, for example, by watching a risk 
story on a morning TV news program, In contrast . 
she could engage in more systematic seeking, 
labeled "non routine," by purposely searching for 
information in channels that she would not nor-
mally monitor, for example, by looking for a spe-
cific study of the risk in the peer-reviewed literature 
or contacting someone at a state health agency. 
Regardless of seeking mode, she can devote vary-
ing amounts of time and energy to understanding 
(via processing) the message. 
She can als.o decide to avoid information 
about the risk, perhaps because the risk makes 
her too fearful or because she regards the risk as 
trivial or unlikely. 
Information (In)Sufficiency 
Systematic seeking and processing are chal-
lenging tasks, so individuals presumably engage in 
such behaviors only when sufficiently motivated. 
Although the HSM advances multiple motives for 
processing. the one most relevant to RISP is the 
"accuracy motivation;' which asserts that a greater 
or lesser need for accurate attitudes and beliefs 
catalyzes information processing choices (Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999). Chaiken et al. (1989) argue that 
individuals will invest the time and energy needed 
to achieve their desired degree of judgmental con-
fidence regarding a decision; that chosen level is 
called the "sufficiency threshold." A low threshold 
may induce heuristic processing, while a high 
threshold may catalyze more intensive informa-
tion gathering and analysis. 
Informational Subjective Norms 
An important component of Ajzen's theory of 
planned behavior adapted for the RlSP model is 
subjective norms. a concept that stems from much 
earlier analyses of social norms in psychology 
(see, e.g .. Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1935). The idea that 
groups of individuals develop common rules or 
expectations and that the perception of such social 
expectations can influence subsequent behavioral 
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choices of individuals remains a compelling focus 
of research. Many scholars employ norms that 
reflect the risk behaviors they seek to modify, 
whether recycling or avoiding texting while driv-
ing (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Rimal & Real, 2005). 
Since we are interested in information seeking and 
processing behaviors. we explore respondent per-
ceptions of whether or not olher individuals 
expect him or her to learn about the risk. We 
employ the label "informational subjective norms:' 
~~ 
':'Relevant Channel Beliefs 
• 
" 
Individuals clearly do not regard all channels 
as created equal. We develop beliefs about infor-
mation channels over the course of our lives that 
can influence our information seeking and pro-
cessing decisions. Kosicki and McLeod (1990) 
argued that our judgment of the "quality" of a 
channel matters, as do beliefs about whether a 
channel is possibly biased or beholden to special 
interests. As noted earlier. beliefs about the cost 
of using a channel may literally drive us into the 
arms of a more accessible one despite concerns 
about the relevance of the information available 
. there (Chaffee, 1986; Hesse et aI. , 2005). 
Additionally, we may perceive the utility of 
channels to vary depending on o ur specific infor-
mat jon needs. While we'may not trust govern-
ment channels to provide "objective" risk 
information, we may feel comfortable relying on 
those channels for information about laws and 
policies relevant to a risk. While we may readily 
interpret risk stories in mediated channels as 
informing us generally about a risk, we may nev· 
ertheless deem such channels to be less useful for 
information about our personal risk challenges 
(Dunwoody & Griffin, 2014). 
Perceived Information 
Gathering Capacity 
Of course, another potential roadblock to seek-
ing and processing behaviors is o ur perception of 
our ability to cull the information needed from 
information channels regardless of their assumed 
quality. Searches for information about health 
risks, for example. sometimes take individuals 
into highly technical prose filled with mathemati-
cal representations of disease probability (see 
Chapler 11 , this volume). Perceptions oflow self-
efficacy in such situations may doom the search to 
failure, perhaps before it even starts. The concept 
of "capacity" used here, thus, is driven largely by 
efficacy. 
Self-efficacy has a long history as an impor-
tant mediator of behavior change (Ajzen, 1988; 
Bandura, 1982). But while most studies explore 
individuals' perceptions of their ability to engage 
in behaviors to, say. reduce smoking or avoid 
binge drinking, we focus here on info rmation 
seeking and processing as behaviors themselves. 
Hence, we have adopted the term perceived infor-
mation gathering capacity, thus applying the 
concept of capacity from the HSM (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993) and extending it to both risk 
information seeking and processing. 
A Test of the Model Across 
Risks and Over Time 
Comparatively few survey data sets in the social 
sciences allow researchers to examine the repli-
cation of results over time. Fortunately, two 
archived studies allow us to do just that with the 
RISP model. In particular, we will examine the 
relationships that risk information seeking and 
processing have with their proximate predictors, 
as illustrated in Figure 7.1 : the motivational vari · 
abies (information insufficiency and informa-
tional subjective norms). relevant chan nel 
beliefs, and perceived information gathering 
capacity. Although some analyses 'have been 
published from these data sets. none have com· 
pared results across studies and across time in 
this manner. 
One data set, the "Great Lakes" study, 
employed the R1SP model as a framework to 
investigate the use of risk information concerning 
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health and environmental risks related to the 
Great Lakes. A professional research organization 
conducted an annual , three-wave telephone sam-
ple survey of a panel of adult residents from two 
metropolitan areas bordering the Great Lakes 
(MHwaukee, Wisconsin, and Cleveland, Ohio) 
from 1996- 1997 through 1998-1999. The study 
was funded by a grant from the federal Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. The 
other data set, also employing the RISP model, is 
from the "Watershed" study. For this project, a 
professional research organization conducted an 
annual, two-wave telephone sample survey of a 
panel of adult residents of two urban river water-
sheds in the Milwaukee area in the winter of 
1999- 2000 and again a year later. Questions 
tapped the respondents' use of information about 
flooding and environmental risks related to the 
local rivers and their environs. The study was 
supported by a STAR (Science to Achieve Results) 
grant from the U.S. Environmental Protection 
. Agency, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and 
the National Science Foundation. 
It is important to note that, within each 
study, respondents were divided into separate 
"paths" of questions, each path aslting about a 
different risk. In the Great Lakes study, indi-
viduals for whof!1 eating Great Lakes fish was a 
relevant matter were asked about potential 
health risks to themselves from consuming fish 
that may contain polychlorinated biphenyls-a 
family of toxic chemicals that were banned in 
the United States in the 1970s but that persist 
nonetheless in the Great Lakes ecosystem. Other 
respondents , on a random basis, were asked 
about personal health risks from consuming tap 
water drawn from the Great Lakes or about eco-
logical risks to the Great Lakes ecosystem itself, 
an impersonal risk in the sense that the respon-
dent himself or herself was not threatened. In 
the third wave of this study, interviews were 
done only with respondents in the fish -related 
path of questioning. In the Watershed study, 
individuals in one watershed were randomly 
assigned to one of two paths of questions: eco-
logical risks to the local river or risks to homes 
and properties from flooding. In the other 
watershed, respondents were asked only about 
ecological risks to the local river. 
Despite these differences in risk topics, the 
questionnaire items that operationalized vari-
ables from the RISP model were otherwise iden-
tical or, in the case of one variable. at least 
comparable. This approach allows us to merge 
responses across paths for each year of each study 
to reveal the overarching patterns of relationships 
between seeking and processing variables and 
their proximate predictors. Details on the general 
measurement and analysis strategies used for 
these data sets. as well as results based on specific 
risks, can be found elsewhere (e.g., Griffin et al ., 
2008; Griffin et aI., 2013; Griffin, Neuwirth, 
Dunwoody, & Giese, 2004; Griffin, Neuwirth, 
Giese, & Dunwoody, 2002; Griffin, Powell, et aI. , 
2004; Kahlor, Dunwoody, Griffin, & Neuwirth, 
2006; Kahlor, Dunwoody, Griffin, Neuwirth, & 
Giese, 2003). On a study-by-study basis, some of 
those results may vary a bit from the umbrella 
analyses to be presented in this chapter because 
of the characteristics of the specific risks exam-
ined in those studies and some differences in 
analysis strategies (e.g .. addition or exclusion of 
some variables). Further information on self-
report measures of heuristic and systematic pro-
cessing of risk information can be found in 
Smerecnik, Mesters, Candel, De Vries, and De 
Vries (2011); see also Johnson (2005). 
Table 7.1 illustrates a series of analyses that 
regress information seeking, avoidance, systematic 
processing. and heuristic processing on the vari-
ous proximate predictor variables (see Figure 7.1) 
for each wave of both studies. Except for the 
operationalization of perceived information gath-
ering capacity, which was changed from the Great 
Lakes study to the later Watershed study, the same 
measures are used across all of these analyses. Of 
particular note is the way that information insuf-
ficiency is measured and represented in the analy-
sis. Respondents had been asked to indicate on a 
o to 100 scale how much they currently know 
about the given risk (current knowledge). Then 
they were asked. using the same scale, to estimate 
the total amount of knowledge that they would 
need in order to achieve an understanding of the 
-o 
'" 
Table 7.1 Performance of Predictors of Risk Information Seeking and Processing Across Two MultiWave Surveys 
------ ---------- -------
Multiple Regression Analyses (betas) 
Dependent Variable Information Seeking Information Avoidance 
Study Great Lakes Watershed Great Lakes Watershed 
Year (Wave) Gl G2 G3 WI W2 Gl G2 G3 WI W2 
Information (in)sufficiency 
Current knowledge .09*'*- .14**- .11 '" .20*** .22*** - .08** -.09** - .09 - .15**· - .12** 
Information sufficiency threshold .20*** .21·*· .16**· .24**· .24**- - .22**- -.23**- - .15*- - .26**- - .24*** 
Informational subjective norms .36**- .32*** AO*** .16**- .20*** -.20*** - .15*** - .22*** - .05 -.13**-
Channel beliefs 
Media distort - .05 - .03 - .08- - .03 - 04 .12*** .13**- .12*'" .06 .12**-
Media have processing cues .00 .01 - .04 .05 - .01 - .10*** - .06 - .05 - .10*- - .04 
Perceived information gathering - .10**- - .15**- - .15**- .16*** .11 * '" .11 *** .09** .11 - - .15**- - .11 ** 
capacity 
Adjusted R' .26"· .27**- .29**- .25*** .25*** .18*** .15*** .14**· .20**- .18*** 
N 1,116 878 457 759 717 1,11 6 878 457 759 717 
.. 
.. ~.---
(Continued) 
.. 
.. 
o 
1lIbie 7.1 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable 
Year (Wave) 
Information (in)sufficiency 
Current knowledge 
Information sufficiency threshold 
Informational subjedive norms 
Channel beliefs 
Media distort 
Media have processing cues 
Perceived information gathering 
capacity 
Adjusted R' 
N 
*p = .05; **p = .01; **.p = .001. 
G1 
.08*· 
.19**-
.31·'*· 
- .05 
.16**-
- .07*-
.24**'* 
1,116 
Systematic Processing 
G2 G3 W1 
.04 .02 .13*** 
.2 1 *** .22**- .30**-
.27*** .24*** .13*** 
- .04 - .06 - .07* 
.15**- .06 ,17*** 
- .06 -.06 .15**-
.19**'* .16**- .27**-
877 457 759 
Heuristic Processing 
W2 G1 G2 G3 W1 W2 
.13**- - .09** - .09*- - .07 - .18*** - .17**-
.29**- - .23**- - .26*** - .25**- - .29**- - .27**-
.22*- - .21**- - .13**- - .2S**'" - .09*- - .20**-
- .07* .14*** .08*- .08 .06 .11**-
.1, ·** .05 .06 .05 - .06 .02 
.09*- .10**- .16**- .17**- - .13**- - .11**-
26**- .18**- .17**- .23**- .24**- .26**-
717 1,116 877 457 759 717 
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risk good enough for their purposes (information 
sufficiency threshold). With current knowledge 
controlled in the multiple regressions, the thresh-
old variable represents the relationship of infor-
mation insufficiency (the information gap) to the 
dependent variable. 
Although the RISP model suggests that moti -
vation (information insufficiency and informa-
tional subjective norms), channel beliefs, and 
capacity might interact to affect risk information 
'seeking and processing. the multiple regressions 
jn Table 7.1 do not exami.ne interactions. Instead, 
only the direct relationships between the inde-
pendent and dependent variables are analyzed, 
with each independent variable controlled by 
the others in each regression. Since each analysis 
is based only on cross-sectional data, the results 
do not reveal patterns of causal direction o r 
influence. 
Results in Table 7. 1 indicate that the motiva-
tion variables have, in general, the strongest and 
most consistent patterns of relationships with 
risk information seeking. avoidance, and pro-
cessing across time and across both studies. 
Congruent with expectations from the RlSP 
model. the greater the information insufficiency 
gap (as represented by the threshold variable), 
the more likely that individuals will seek addi-
tional information about the risk, the less likely 
they will avoid it, the more likely they will pro-
cess the information systematically, and the less 
likely they will process it heuristically. The same 
patterns of relationships with seeking. avoidance, 
and processing also hold for informational sub-
Jective norms, with only on~ exception-a non-
Significant relationship with avoidance in the 
first Watershed wave. 
The RISP model treats as exploratory the 
direct and indirect relationships that individuals' 
channel beliefs might have with seeking, avoid-
ing. and processing risk information. As illus-
trated in Table 7. 1, channel beliefs show 
somewhat consistent patterns of relationships 
with three dependent variables. Beliefs that 
information channels provide cues about the 
trustworthiness of the information they contain 
ace related positively to systematic processing of 
risk information in four of the six comparisons. 
Similarly, individuals' beliefs that information 
channels are biased and distort reality tend to be 
associated with aVOiding such channels for risk 
information (four of six comparisons) and with 
processing the risk information superficially 
(three of six comparisons). Although consistent 
with the model, these relationships are weak, 
perhaps a function of operationalizing channel 
beliefs to reflect respondents' general views of 
mass media content. Indeed, Griffin et a!. (2013) 
have called for a reconceptualization of the 
channel beliefs components of the RlSP model 
to reflect individuals' expectations about the 
specific outcomes for themselves from using a 
wide variety of channels for gathering risk infor-
mation and how they value those outcomes_ 
Such an approach might adapt Palm green and 
Rayburn's (1982) expectancy value model, which 
shares its roots with the theory of planned 
behavior (Ajzen, 1988). 
Table 7. 1 also illustrates the effects of chang-
ing the measures of perceived information gath· 
ering capacity between the Great Lakes study and 
the later Watershed study. For the Watershed 
study, respondents answered six Likert-scaled 
items that reflected their self-reported capacity to 
seek risk information from media. government 
agencies, and other sources (e.g., knowledge of 
where to go for the information, having the time 
to do so), and their capacity to process it (e.g., 
possessing the abilities to understand the infor· 
mation and to separate fact from fiction). This 
summated measure of capacity correlates posi · 
tively with seeking risk information and process· 
ing it systematically and negatively with aVOiding 
the information and processing it heuristically, 
across both waves of the Watershed study. Even 
though the results are relatively weak, they are 
consistent with the model. In contrast.-the capac· 
ity measure used in the Great Lakes study tends 
to have had the opposite relationships with risk 
information seeking, avoiding, and processing 
(especially heuristic). This set of two Likert-
scaled measures asked respondents. much more 
broadly, to indicate how easy or difficult it would 
be for them to get useful information about the 
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risk from mass media and other sources and to 
acquire any information they need from those 
channels if they wanted to. These items empha-
size risk information seeking but not necessarily 
processing. 
It is unclear why these two versions of capac-
ity work in contrary ways. albeit weakly. in these 
analyses. It certainly may be the case that our 
construction of one or both of these operation-
alizations is unreliable. Another explanation. 
however. might be the different loci of control 
emphasized in the measures: The Watershed 
capacity scale tends to focus more on internal 
locus of control and perceived self-efficacy (e.g .• 
Bandura. 1977. 1995). whereas the Great Lakes 
capacity scale has stronger overtones of external 
locus of control. that is. the individual being 
subject to the availability of risk information in 
media and other sources. A related possibility is 
tbat. with the Great Lakes capacity measure. 
those who perceive greater ease of access to the 
[isk information may not feel the need to 
expend much effort to get it. Regardless. the 
Watershed capac ity measure (Griffin et al.. 
2008) seems to be a better fit conceptually for 
the RISP model, since it details several relevant 
components of self-efficacy within the individ-
ual and jnclude~ processing as well as seeking 
measures. It warrants further exploration and 
development. 
Neither chan nel beliefs nor perceived infor-
mation gathering capacity had strong direct 
relationships with risk information seeking. 
avoidance. or processing in this analysis. Of 
course. much of the impact that channel beliefs 
and capacity might have on these dependent 
variables could be contained in the proposed 
interactions these factors may have with the 
m o tivational variables (information insuffi -
ciency and informational subjective norms). It 
would also be worth exploring the relationships 
between capacity and channel beliefs. especially 
as the latter would become redefIned in expec-
tancy value terms. It is possible that an individ-
ual's beliefs about the personal outcomes of 
using various channels for risk information 
(e.g .• online channels. professional channels. 
and mass media) could be affected by his or her 
self-efficacy in getting and processing the infor-
mation from those channels, or vice versa. For 
example. as mentioned earlier, individuals typi-
cally identify physicians as their preferred chan-
nel for health information. yet they are more 
likely to access health information via mediated 
channels such as the mainstream media and the 
lnternet (Hesse et al.. 2005). The reason-at 
least in the American culture- is that people do 
not feel that they can easily access a physician 
and. thus. are reacting to lower levels of self-
efficacy (Hesse et al.. 2005). (For a discussion 
of the relationships between self-efficacy and 
outcome beliefs. see Williams. 2010.) 
Reflections for Theory 
and Research 
Tests of the RISP model over time and across 
risks indicate that individuals will indeed engage 
in more effortful information seeking and pro-
cessing of risk information when they feel social 
pressures to know about the risk or sense that 
they have insufficient information for decision 
making. This is good news for policymakers and 
for communication professionals who emphasize 
the importance of providing information as an 
important catalyst to learning and possible 
behavior change. Further research might explore 
other motivations for seeking and processing 
that might be applicable to risk information. 
including the defense and impression motiva-
tions that complement the HSM accuracy moti-
vation (e.g .• Chen. Duckworth. & Chaiken. 1999) 
and a variety of drivers that stem from the media 
uses and gratifications models (e.g .• McGuire. 
1974; Rubin. 2009). 
We suspect that many factors influence the 
relationship between motivations and the seek-
ing and processing of risk information; among 
them are a person's perception of his ability to 
find information successfully and beliefs about 
the nature and quality of available information 
'. 
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channels. R1SP studies to date support these 
speculations at only a modest level; additional 
work is needed to explore the potency of such 
moderators. especially as they might interact 
with individuals' motivations to seek and process 
risk information. 
Affect likely also plays a role in people's deci-
sions about information. The RISP model as 
explored to date is heavily cognitive. since the 
proximate predictors of seeking and processing. 
including informational subjective norms, are 
based essentially on beliefs. R1SP has yet to 
e~arnine affective dimensions to any great 
extent. although Griffin et al. (2013) have called 
for such exploration. Mood states. for example. 
can influence how people seek and process the 
information they need for making a judgment 
(e.g .• Clore et al.. 2001; De Vries. Holland. & 
Witteman. 2008; Schwarz. 1990). Risk percep-
tion researchers have embraced "the affect heu-
ristic" in recent years (see. e.g .• Slavic. 2010; 
see Chapter 3. this volume). Thus. scholars need 
to find a way to incorporate both cogn itive and 
affective factors in their efforts to understand 
predictors and outcomes of seeking and 
processing risk information. 
Recommendatio,)s for Practice 
Studies of information seeking and processing 
suggest that practitioners who seek to use infor-
mation to inform or motivate need to be sensitive 
to such "drivers" as perceived need for informa-
tion and individuals' senses. of efficacy when it 
comes to finding and using novel information. 
These factors will come as no surprise to experP 
enced risk communication strategists. But the 
all -too-common focus in many campaigns on 
ensuring the credibility of sources may lead prac-
titioners to neglect the critical importance of 
channel credibility. If. as we suspect. many indi-
viduals make decisions based on the credibility of 
the channel-not the source-then the potency 
of messages situated in the wrong channel will be 
greatly reduced. 
After decades of research and practical expe· 
rience, the experienced risk communicator 
knows a great deal about how to motivate indi-
viduals to seek and process information about 
personal risks. But what courses of action can be 
effective when the risks of interest -are "imper-
sonal:' that is. not obviously relevant to the indi-
vidual? Many practitioners work within this 
impersonal domain. trying to motivate behavior 
change in the face of climate change or to con-
front major public health issues that affect "oth-
ers:' The RlSP model offers one clue. Individuals 
facing, say. an issue affecting the environment 
may feel no personal involvement in the topic but 
may ramp up their information seeking and pro-
cessing behaviors when they believe that others 
feel they should do so. Informational subjective 
norms-the perception that others believe one 
should learn about such a risk- are among the 
strongest predictors of seeking and processing in 
these impersonal situations. This suggests that 
practitioners should seek every opportunity to 
make audiences aware of their social environ-
ment when that environment has declared a 
particuJar risk to be important. 
Conclusions 
As a resu1t of our decades of research on infor-
mation seeking and processing. we have become 
intrigued by the potential of informational sub-
jective norms. In our studies, jf an individual felt 
that others expected her to learn about the risk. 
she was more likely to engage in effortful seeking 
and processing of information. This suggests that 
individua1s are sensit ive to the information man-
agement behaviors of others and may take behav-
ioral cues from others even when they, themselves. 
do not regard a risk as sufficiently" salient to 
require an expenditure of energy. 
Also notable is that norms are often unobtru-
sive. That is. they often operate outside the 
awareness of the individual. When people are 
asked to identify factors that influenced their 
decision to modify their behaviors. they rarely 
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mention their awareness of the behaviors of 
others (descriptive norms) or a perception that 
others think they should behave in certain ways 
(injunctive norms). Yet studies show that these 
norms are, in fact, among the most powerful 
predictors (see. e.g .• Nolan. Schultz. Cialdini. 
Goldstein. & Griskevicius. 2008) . 
This brings us back full circle. to the "deliber-
ation-without-attention" effect (Dijksterhuis et 
al.. 2006) mentioned at the beginn ing of this 
chapter. which posits that good decisions about 
complex problems can happen in the absence of 
purposive attention and effort. Scholarly interest 
in unobtrusive motivators of decision making is 
on the rise, thanks in part to scientists' increased 
access to brain activity. and there may well be 
powerful, unobtrusive motivators-in addition 
to norms- that drive information seeking and 
processing. We await a new generation of com-
munication researchers-turn ed-neuroscientists 
to open those doors. 
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